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The energy sector covers the coal,  oil, gas and electricity sector. 
The European coal and oil sector have already been liberalised in 
the  past.  The  current  iliberalisation  debate  concerns mainly  the 
electricity and the gas sector. In this paper we wil1 concentrate on 
the  electricity  sector for  three  reasons.  First,  the sector  is  more 
important in terms of value added, secondly it is considered to be 
more  complex and, finally,  the  opening of  the  electricity market 
precedes that of the gas market. Obviously, this does not mean that 
the gas sector should not be studied as there are many challenges 
left. 
In section 11, we discuss the institutional background for the liber- 
alisation. Section I11 then analyses the British experience. This is of 
interest because the UK has liberalised its market about l0 years ago 
and  this  experience  has  been  the  subject  of  extensive  economic 
research. In the sections IV to VII, we focus on the four main prob- 
lems  in  the  liberalisation  of  the  European electricity  market: the 
stranded costs issue, the cross-subsidies issue, the pricing of trans- 
mission and the regulation of the environment. Finally, section V111 
concludes. 
11.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The different enera sectors 
Traditionally, one distinguishes at least four different energy sectors 
that each use a different energy product to satisfy the energy needs of 
the consumers. These are sumrnarised in Table l. 
Trade in coal and coke was liberalised first in the EU in the early 
1950s.  At that moment it was still the dominant energy vector, and its 
liberalisation was a necessary component of an open market for steel. 
Whereas most of the European Union's energy sectors are relatively 
healthy, this cannot be said for the coal mines, which are chronically 
unprofitable  and  heavily  subsidised by  national governments. The 
ECSC Treaty, which provides the legislative framework for the coal 
and steel industry, prohibits state aid. However, in a series of frame- 
work Decisions over the years, the Commission has the authority to 
approve aid provided by governments. The  Commission  made  large  efforts  to  persuade  or  coerce  the 
Community coal industry to reduce the very high operating costs by 
restnicturing  and closing pits. An important transition took place at 
the  end of  1993, when the  new  ECSC  coal aid regime  caine  into 
force,  which  regulates  state  aid  until  the  ECSC  Treaty  expires 
entirely  in  2002.  During  the  1986-93 period,  al1 the  coal mining 
industries in Belgiuin, Portugal, France and the UK cut back capacity 
and reduced government subsidies ahead of or at least in line with the 
Commission's policy. For each State, the Coininission was concerned 
to  ensure  that  subsidies  decreased  each year.  In Belgium,  mining 
ceased altogether in  1992. France has made prodiiction ciitbacks in 
recent years and is now on a path to cease output by 2005. 
Oil products became more important than coal in the 1960s. Most 
oil was imported and processed by international companies, but the 
Eiiropean oil sector has been liberalised for some decades now. It is 
now the most open and liberalised energy industry in the European 
Conlmunity. 
TABLE 1 
The different  eneugy sectors 
Share of total final energy 
consumed 
Coal  16,4%  3,9% 
Oil  61,8%  51,8% 
Gas  8,7%  2 1,7% 
Electricity  10,8%  17,5% 
The electricity industry has been growing since its origin, as can 
be seen in Table 1. The sector has also been a legal monopoly mostly 
run by public companies in many countries. This has changed only 
very recently, as in  1996 al1 EU member countries were forced to 
organise competition  at the  generation level while  accepting regii- 
lated monopolies at the transport and distribution level. 
The conversion  from  coal based  gas to  natura1 gas  in the  early 
1970s required a transition from local production facilities and net- 
works to an industry that relied entirely on international pipeline net- 
works  bringing  gas  from  the  Netherlands,  Nonvay,  Algeria  and Russia. In inost countries, the gas industry was  a legal monopoly. 
The EU Gas Directive has been adopted in 1998. Member countries 
have until August 2000 to develop the laws, regulations and institu- 
tions to liberalise the gas market. The genera1 principles of the Gas 
Directive are not different fiom the Electricity Directive. However, 
the main element of  competition in the gas sector comes from the 
possibility  to buy gas from different producers via non-discrimina- 
tory access to the network. 
B. Electricip sector developments 
The Directive 96/92/EC, concerning common niles  of  the internal 
market  in electricity was  adopted by  the  Council of Ministers  on 
December  19,  1996.  It  entered  into  force  two  months  later  on 
Febniary 19, 1997. The Directive starts with a list of considerations 
that have led to the Directive. These are important for a clear under- 
standing of the background of the Directive and its overall aims. The 
ultimate  goal is "to increase efJiciency in the production,  transmis- 
sion and distribution of electricip, while reinforcing securip of sup- 
ply and the competitiveness of the European economy and respecting 
environmental protection." 
Basically, the Directive provides for: 
Free competition in generation, with either an authorisation or a 
tendering procedure for building new generation capacity. Most 
countries  have  opted  for  an  authorisatioii procedure,  which 
means that al1 parties that satisfi the safety, security, environ- 
mental and public service criteria are able to produce as much as 
they want. 
A market on the consumers' side, that is open to a miniinurn 
degreel. The largest consumers will be the first to benefit from 
an  open market,  smaller  consumers will  follow. A member 
state that opens up its inarket for a larger percentage than pro- 
vided by the Directive, is allowed to restrict access to suppliers 
from countries that did not open up to the Same degree (reci- 
procity). 
Free access2  to the transmission network via Third Party Access, 
a Single Buyer, or a mix of these. The national transmission 
network  (high  voltage  transport)  has  to be  run  by  a  system 
operator that is responsible  for the network maintenance  and development and for the dispatching of the generation plants. 
Most countries have opted for regulated  access, which ineans 
that the tariffs for the use of the grid are fixed and can not be 
renegotiated. 
An  unbundling  of  accounts between  generation,  transmission, 
distribution and other non-electric activities, if these are present 
within one  company. The  accounts must  be  accessible to the 
regulatory authorities; 
Public service obligations that may relate to security, including 
seciirity of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies and 
environmental protection. 
Even if the Directive leaves some degrees of freedom to the inem- 
ber countries, it seems that most countries opt for the same genera1 
orientations. Fie  1 summarises graphically the  liberalisation of the 
European electricity sector. 
FIGURE  1 
The effect of liber-alising the electriciq mauket 
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is not the end of the reform. Many problems remain unsettled. In this 
text we wil1 focus on four problems. First, we examine two transition 
problems that have received special attention the last years: stranded 
costs and cross-subsidies. Next, we briefly discuss how to set trans- 
mission  tariffs  and  how  to  integrate  environmental  considerations 
int0 an open electricity market. We  start however by surveying the 
British experience. They liberalised the market in  1989 and we can 
learn from their experience. 
111.  THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 
In March 1990, the state owned CEGB was divided into 4 public lim- 
ited  companies: The National  Grid Company, PowerGen, National 
Power and Nuclear Electric. The 12 Regional Electricity Coinpanies 
(RECs), who owned the local distribution assets, were given shares 
in  the  National  Grid  Company  aild  were  sold  to  the  public  in 
December  1990. In  1991, a majority  share of National  Power and 
PowerGen was sold to the public. Initially, the nuclear power stations 
were kept in the public company Nuclear Electric, but in  1996 this 
company was also privatised (Newbeny (1998)). 
FIGURE 2 
The UK electriciq nzarket in 1995 
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Transmission and The  electric  power  producers  were  privatised  with  long  term 
British coal contracts above the world market price  and with  long 
term contracts that guaranteed that the RECs would buy an important 
share of the total production. Both the coal contracts and the electric- 
ity delivery contracts were to decrease in importance over the years. 
Initially, only the industrial customers had access to an open electric- 
ity market, but from 1998 onwards al1 consumers are able to select 
their supplier. 
The situation in 1995 is sumrnarised Figure 2 (taken from Wolfram 
(1999)). 
Wolfram (1999) gives a fùrther description of the British electric- 
ity market system. Al1 wholesale electricity transactions in England 
and Wales go through a centra1 pool. The pool is a "day ahead mar- 
ket" where for every day ahead, producers submit bid schedules that 
detail the prices  and capacities of each plant they are prepared to 
operate. The network operator uses these received bids and demand 
forecasts to determine  a  system marginal price  (p*  in Figure  3). 
This is done for every half an hour. The pool price that is received 
by al1 producers equals the system marginal price plus an additional 
factor that covers the capacity cost. The vast majority of the trans- 
actions are covered by direct contracts between generators and their 
customers. These direct contracts most often take the pool price as 
FIGURE 3 
Determination of System Mavginal Puice 
Q *  Quantity 
43  9 reference but can include different types of protection against price 
uncertainties. 
The pool prices are market prices and are not directly regulated. 
However, the  industry  regulator  (OFFER) possesses  an  important 
instrument for intervening in the pool when he judges the prices as 
too high because he can refer the generators to the Monopolies and 
Mergers  Commission  (MMC). This  Commission  can  take  drastic 
steps such as breaking up the existing companies so as to create more 
competitors. As a result, the regulator's appreciation of the pool price 
level is certainly taken int0 account by the generators. 
A.  mat  explains the price setting of genevators? 
In the UK, the breaking up of the CEGB resulted in a duopoly where 
PowerGen and National Power restricted the capacity made available 
at low prices in order to get better prices. This was demonstrated by 
Green  and  Newbeny  (1992).  Wolfram  (1999)  analysed  a  longer 
period and used different techniques. The values she found for the 
mark-up are reported in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
Mark-up values in the UK electricity sector 
% of 
maxima1 
Time period  market  (P -  MC)P 
power 
used3 
Jan 92 -  March 93  15%  0,24 1 
April 93 -  March 94  20%  0,259 
April 94 -  Dec 94 (price cap)  20%  0,208 
4 weeks before a regulatory decision  0,329 
4 weeks after a regulatory decision  0,156 
source: Wolfram (1999) and own computations 
This  table  shows  clearly that  mark-ups  were  important  (of the 
order of 25%) and that two generators was not enough to have per- 
fect competition4.  Another sign of market control is that after the set- 
ting of a price cap in March 1994, the generators were able to arrange 
prices that matched almost exactly the price cap. However, the mark-ups are below the theoretica1 mark-ups a duop- 
oly could get. Column 2 in Table 2 shows this: the realised mark up is 
only some 20% of the profit maximising mark up of a pure duopoly. 
Wolfram advances two factors to explain this restraint in their price 
setting behaviour: 
The presence of a regulator that can cap prices, send the finns to 
the  Monopolies  and  Mergers  Comrnission, etc.  The  mark-up 
after a regulatory decision was always much lower 4 weeks afier 
than 4 weeks before a regulatory decision (see Table 2). 
The potential entry of new competitors: pool prices were set just 
under a potential entry's long run marginal cost (CCGT plants) 
and  pool  prices  followed  the  fluctuations  of  the  gas  prices 
although gas plants were not the marginal plants. 
B.  Who gained from  the introduction of competition? 
Newbeny (1998) and Newbeny and Pollit (1997) analysed the costs 
and benefits of the liberalised electricity market in the UK. 
On the generation side they found very strong gains in productiv- 
ity. They give the example of a coal power station of 4000 MW that 
halved  its  labour  force  from  1200  to  600  people.  Productivity 
increases  were  realised  as  wel1  in  (the  publicly  owned)  Nuclear 
Electric. 
Important changes also occurred on the hel side. Before the pri- 
vatisation, the electricity sector used about three quarters of the total 
coal production in Britain and paid coal prices above the world mar- 
ket price. After a few years, these long term contracts for British coal 
were abolished and cleaner and cheaper imported coal and gas were 
used  instead. The  British  nuclear  power  stations were  build  as  a 
weapon against coal mine strikes and their construction and operation 
was subsidised5. Initially, these nuclear power stations proved non- 
competitive, but under pressure of the market they also experienced 
large productivity increases. 
Newbeny and Pollit (1997) analysed the distribution of the gains 
of this liberalisation. They found a permanent cost reduction in the 
order of 5% and important environmental benefits. The major benefi- 
ciaries of these cost reductions were the new shareholders while the 
consumers and the taxpayers  actually  lost money. This  is possible 
because not al1 the productivity gains and fuel price decreases were 
fully passed  on to the  consuiners  and the  goveinment.  The major explanation why important profits subsisted has to do with the small 
number of competitors on the generation market. 
Another factor is that before 1998, the small consumers could not 
choose their supplier. They have been forced to pay for the decom- 
missioning  liabilities of nuclear plants  and, via  the RECs, for the 
expensive British coal used in power generation. 
According to Newberry (1998), governments are keen on privati- 
sation but tend to restrict competition. More competition reduces the 
privatisation receipts and the power to  intervene. Abuse of market 
power is an excellent reason for politica1 and regulatory guidance. By 
using the anti-trust suit, the government can persuade those with mar- 
ket power to burn more local coal, or collect more money for specific 
consumer groups, to invest in green energy, etc. 
Another lesson drawn by Newberry (1998) is that it has been very 
difficult to design a good and cheap system for competition at the 
retail level. 
A final lesson drawn by Newberry (1998) is that the Labour gov- 
ernment's  ban  on  new  gas  fired  entry  has  decreased  competition 
again. The objective of Labour was to stimulate the demand for coal. 
The likely result is that the windfall profit tax imposed by Labour 
will be paid by the consumers. 
Note however that, even if some important lessons can be drawn, 
the Ewopean market liberalisation cannot directly be compared with 
the British case. At least 3  important differences can be identified. 
m  First in the UK, a public monopoly was privatised and broken 
up int0 parts that will compete. In the EU, there is not necessar- 
ily a privatisation or a braking up of existing companies, but a 
liberalisation via opening of national borders. The number  of 
competitors is also very likely to be higher than three. 
In the UK, there is one integrated national electricity network 
that allows competition between generators in the same country. 
In the EU, there is a collection of national grids that each are 
wel1 integrated and that are interconnected to  solve reliability 
problems.  However,  the  international  connections  were  not 
designed to create one integrated European market so that trade 
possibilities could be restricted in the first years of competition. 
In the UK (England and Wales), there is one regulator and one 
market for power. In the EU, tliere are national regulators and a 
European monitoring of competition. We  now move on with a brief discussion of some major issues that 
need some special attention in the process towards liberalised elec- 
tricity markets. 
IV.  THE STRANDED COST ISSUE 
Stranded costs have to do with tlie transition from a regulated to a 
competitive electricity market. They refer to the problem of recover- 
ing past iilvestinents costs and have been presented as a major obsta- 
cle in the transition to ai1 open electricity market. They are more typ- 
ical  in  electricity  marltets  where  the  initia1  finn  was  a  private 
monopolist because he will accept less easily to absorb losses from 
past investment than a p~iblic  coinpany or than a public company that 
is privatised. In the United States the market opening started a few 
years  earlier than  in  Europe,  and  the  stranded costs  concept was 
invented there. The discussion focused on several questions, such as 
what is the exact definition of stranded costs? Should the industry be 
able to  recover them? If  so, who  should pay  for them? And how 
should they be recovered? 
In the European Directive, there is an  explicit provision dealing 
with stranded costs (article 24). Obviously, the definition of stranded 
costs is crucial as this will have an effect on the ultimate stranded 
cost estimate. For Belgium, stranded cost estimates ranged between 
500 M EURO and 5000 M EURO. We now present our definition of 
stranded costs. Furthermore, we show when stranded costs will exist 
and what are the consequences of allowing generation firms of recov- 
ering them. 
A.  A de$nition  of stranded costs 
Before the liberalisation, electricity generating firms made different 
expenditures that are considered sunk or fixed. It would be wrong to 
label al1 of them as unrecoverable or 'stranded' when the electricity 
market is opened up. Some of these costs would also have been made 
in a competitive market. But some are typical for a firm operating in 
a regulated market. Because they were imposed by the regulator, or 
because the firm chose to make these costs. Concerning the first cat- 
egory, the fixed or sunk costs imposed by the regulator, one could 
argue that it should be  allowed to  the  firrn to recoup these  costs, whatever the market stmcture is. We wil1 cal1 them strandable costs. 
However, it is difficult to defend this position for the latter category 
of fixed costs. 
TABLE 3 
Tlze dejìnltlori of strandable and stranded  costs 
RECOVERABLE 
IMPOSED BY THE REGULATOR? 
This is surnmarised in Table 3. Two categories of fixed or sunk 
costs  are distinguished, those  imposed by  the regulator  and those 
resulting from decisions taken by the firm itself. In this paper, the 
costs in the first category are called strandable, those in the second 
category are not strandable. If stranded costs are present, then they 
should be in the strandable category, the non-strandable costs cannot 
become  stranded.  But  not  al1  strandable  costs  are  necessarily 
stranded, since  some of them  can be (partially) recovered via  the 
market. Only those strandable costs that can not be recovered via the 
Yes 
market  are  stranded.  In  the  table  the  shaded  area  indicates  the 
stranded costs. 
Summarising, strandable costs are defined as those fixed  and sunk 
No 
costs  that were imposed by the regulator in  the regulated  market. 
Stranded costs are then defined as strandable  costs that cannot be 
recovered via the market if the rnarket is opened up for  competition. 
Comparing  this  latter  definition  with  other  ones  in  the  literature 
leams that it closely resembles the one given by Baumol, Joskow and 
Kahn  (Doane and Williams (1995), p.42). However, our definition 
puts more emphasis on the role of the regulator or the supervising 
authority. We  stress that the regulator  should impose the  expendi- 
tures, whereas Baumol et. al. include expenditures approved by the regulator. Clearly, the latter is a much broader definition of stranded 
costs because it implicitly opens the door for al1 sunk costs made by 
the regulated firm  to become stranded. 
B. The economics of stranded costs: Aa 
The link between strandable costs, stranded costs and other cost con- 
cepts can be illustrated graphically. This section presents this illustra- 
tion. Furthennore, it tackles questions such as when do stranded costs 
exist? If stranded costs exist, are there economic reasons to allow for 
stranded costs recoiipment? Can, on a theoretica1 basis, anything be 
said about the size of the stranded costs? Each of these questions is 
answered by using the graphical t001 and the analysis is kept as sim- 
ple as possible6. 
1. The regulated market 
Assume that the total demand for electricity is perfectly inelastic and 
equals  q,,  which  corresponds  to  the  size  of  the  horizontal  axis. 
Initially, there is only one generation firm. This firm is called the 
incumbent and its cost structure is shown in Figure 4. It is assumed 
that  the  average cost  of  electricity generation  (AC,)  decreases  for 
some smaller levels of output, but in the range we are considering the 
average cost of electricity generation is increasing. The incumbent's 
marginal  cost  of  electricity  generation  is  assumed to  increase  lin- 
early7. The average variable cost is labelled AVC,.  The vertical dis- 
tance between ACI and AVC,  is a measure of the average fixed gen- 
eration cost AFCI. The present  analysis only considers the  cost of 
electricity generation. 
We  assume that it is compulsory in the regulated market to meet 
the marltet demand and that the regulator sets the price for electricity 
generation such that economic profit equals zero, i.e. pR  = AC,(q,). 
The latter assumption is made for illustrative purposes, and has no 
effect on the conclusions of the analysis. 
2.  The liberalised market 
Now assume that the market for electricity generation is opened up for 
competition and that the marltet demand for electricity remains equal 
to q,.  Furthermore, assume that several potential entrants are compet- 
ing for a market share and that each of these entrants has sufficient capacity to supply the market at a constant marginal cost (MC,).  This 
assumption may be a good approximation for what wil1 happen on the 
Belgian electricity inarket. Belgium is a small open economy, with a 
relatively small production capacity compared to the available capac- 
ity in the surrounding countries8. 
Coinpetition  between  entrants  ensures  that  the  entrant's  price 
equals his marginal cost. Furthermore, we assume that if the incum- 
bent  increases his price  above the  entrant's  marginal cost, then he 
woiild immediately be pushed out of the market. 
In Figure 4 the market demand for electricity q,  is supplied by two 
generation firms, the incumbent (1) and the entrant (E). The vertical 
axis on the left-hand side is the incumbent's axis, the entrant's axis is 
at the right-hand side. 
a.  The competitive outcome 
Under the assunlptions listed above, the competitive market outcome 
wil1 always be such thatp = MC, = MCE,  which is generally accepted 
as optima1 from ai1 efficiency point of view. In Figure 4, the incum- 
bent's output would reduce to q*, whereas the entrant's output would 
be (q,  -  q*). The implied price of electricity generation decreases (pC 
< pR),  but this is not a genera1 result. In fact the market price is deter- 
mined by the marginal cost of the entrant. 
FIGURE 4 
The competitive market b.  Economic welfare 
It can be shown that in this simple model social welfare increases as 
the market is liberalised. Furthermore, it can als0 be shown that the 
change in social welfare is equal to the efficiency gain that is made 
through improved production efficiency. The shaded area in Figure 4 
is a measure of this 'benefit'. 
3.  The stranded costs 
In order to show the stranded costs in a figure, we need to take a closer 
look at the fired costs. According to our definition, only those fxed or 
sunk costs imposed by the regulator are candidates to become stranded, 
i.e. are strandable. In order to make this distinction, the fixed costs are 
divided in strandable and non-strandable fixed costs (Fs  and F,,).  This 
results in the AFmCrcurve  in Figure 5 and Figure 6, which represent 
the average non-strandable fixed costs. Now, consider two cases9. 
a.  The market price covers the average costs 
In Figure 5, both the strandable and the non-strandable fixed costs 
are covered by the market price. The domestic firm produces q* and 
makes an economic profit equal to the area pCE,E,D.  As was said 
FIGURE 5 
The competitive price  is higher than the average cost of the incumbent before, from an efficiency point of view this market outcome is opti- 
inal. There is no reason why the government or any other regulator 
should intervene by allowing the recovery of strandable costs since 
the market automatically arrives in a Pareto-optima1 situation. In fact, 
there are no stranded costs in this case. 
b.  The  market  price  does  not  cover  the  average  costs 
but does cover average variable costs 
In  this  case, the  market  outcome could be  as  shown  in  Figure  6. 
Standard economic theory then suggests that in the short run the firm 
will stay in the market since stopping activity will only imply an even 
larger loss. The point E, indicates the short run price-output combina- 
tion for the incumbent firm. This point implies a loss per unit of out- 
put equal to E2E, and a total loss equal to the rectangle DE2E,pC. The 
stranded costs in this case are equal to that part of the strandable costs 
that is not recovered via the market, which als0 equals DE2E,pC. 
FIGURE 6 




I  l 
0,  'I*  O,='Ii, 
Again, there is no case for allowing stranded costs recovery from 
the point of view of efficiency. The incumbent incurs a loss due to the presence of strandable costs, but this does not influence the out- 
put decision. The Pareto-efficient output will  still be the  outcome. 
One could also turn around the question: is there a case for not 
allowing stranded costs recovery? No, there is neither. If the incum- 
bent is allowed to recover stranded costs and if the recovery is organ- 
ised in a competitively  neutra1 way, then  the firm will choose the 
same Pareto-efficient  output. The difference between both  cases  is 
that the burden of stranded costs is (partially) shifted from the firm to 
the consumers andlor the government. 
Standard economic theory also suggests that a firm, not  able to 
cover its fixed costs in the short run, will leave the market in the long 
run. This is tme, but  in the present  model, the  situation might be 
slightly different beca~~se  strandable costs are a short run phenome- 
non. In the long run, the owners of the firm will absorb the strandable 
costs, and the firm will only reoptimise its non-strandable fixed costs. 
If it is possible for the firm to cover its long run average costs (now 
not containing any strandable costs anymore) with the market price, 
then it will stay in the market. If on the other hand, the firm is not 
able to cover its long run average costs through the marltet price, then 
it will leave the market. From an efficiency point of view, this would 
even be optimal. 
This reasoning  puts  an upper  limit  on the  financial  support  for 
stranded costs recovery. The support should not be  larger than the 
amount of the strandable costs. If the regulator sets the compensation 
at a level that covers more than the strandable costs, then he is subsi- 
dising  some  of  the  non-strandable  fixed  costs  of  the  incumbent, 
which  may  create  the  wrong  incentives  for  the  incumbent.  The 
incumbent may decide to stay in the marltet, whereas we know that 
this is not optiinal from the point of view of efficiency. 
4.  Some simulation exercises 
A siinple simulatioii model was used to test what could be the wel- 
fare effects of a transinission  fee to recover  stranded costs on the 
Belgian  market.  The  effect  on welfare  of  opening  the  electricity 
market for the big industrial consumers depends on the supply price 
of the  foreign producers  and on the  ease with which the big con- 
sumers switch to another supplier. When the supply price of the for- 
eign producer is only slightly lower than the inarginal  cost of the 
home producer,  opening  the market  could give welfare  gains  and higher profits for domestic generator. The welfare gains come from 
imports at lower costs than the indigenous production. Despite the 
loss of market share for the home producer, his gross profits are not 
affected much because of two reasons. First, the protected market is 
responsible  for the major share of the  gross profits. Secondly, the 
home producer might be able to charge higher prices at home for the 
market  share he keeps  at home.  Sensitivity  studies show that the 
opening of the market does not lead to negative profits and therefore 
that the strandable cost would never become stranded. 
5. Conclusions 
When  one  is  concerned  about  economic  efficiency,  allowing  for 
stranded cost recovery is not necessary. On the other hand, allowing 
for  recovery  would  not  hurt  either,  but  if  financial  support  for 
stranded costs recovery  is given, then  it  should be  organised  in  a 
competitively neutral way. Moreover, there is an upper limit to the 
size of the support, i.e. it may not be larger than the strandable costs. 
Of course, if there is no recovery of stranded costs, then the firn wil1 
make a loss on the home market but this does not result in ineffi- 
ciencies. 
V.  CROSS SUBSIDIES 
In most European countries the market is not liberalised at once. In 
general, one started with the biggest customers, while the SMEs and 
the  residential  sector have  to  wait  a  few  years  before  they  have 
access to the European market. This situation creates a potential for 
cross-subsidies between the liberalised and the noii-liberalised mar- 
ket. 
This risk is one of the recurrent topics in the liberalisation debate 
and the Belgian Electricity law explicitly foresees measures to avoid 
such cross-subsidies. One can expect an increasing attention for the 
problem both  from the  side of the  smal1 consuiners  and from the 
coinpetitors of Electrabel. In this section we first exainine the defini- 
tion  of cross subsidies  and then we  indicate where  and why cross 
subsidies occur. Next,  we  discuss the potential  for  cross  subsidies 
after the liberalisation and the ways to reduce or eliminate this poten- 
tial. We conclude with a proposal for reducing cross-subsidies. A.  The cross-stibsidy definitior? 
According to the econoinic literature, prices are cross-subsidy-fl-ee  if 
tliey satisfy the following two conditions (See Faulhaber (1975) aiid 
Curien (1991)). 
For each customer the price  is below the average stand-aloiie 
cost for that customer. Tlie stand-alone cost is tlie cost for a cus- 
tomer of self-providing the good or the service. This defines an 
upper bo~ind  on the set of cross-subsidy free prices. 
Each  consumer  is paying  a price  not  lower than  the  average 
incremental cost. This defiiies a lower bound on the set of cross- 
subsidy-free prices. 
Note that price differences are not necessarily an indication of cross- 
subsidies, and unifonn pricing might still hide cross-subsidies. 
The major disadvantage of this  'definition'  is the size of tlie gap 
between the lower and the upper bound of the set of cross-subsidy- 
free prices.  Furthermore,  applying  this  definition requires  a  lot  of 
inforination not readily available in practice. This malces that cross- 
subsidies are difficult to identify. In this paper, we accept the exis- 
tence of a cross-subsidy if a disproportional share of the joint costs is 
included in the tariffs applicable for a given segment of the market. 
B.  Why is there a problem with cross-subsidies? 
Prices  convey  important  econoinic  inforination. They  should  give 
incentives to customers and producers to allocate scarce resources in 
an efficient way, i.e. to squeeze tlie maxiinum out of the  available 
resources. Prices  containing  cross-subsidies  wil1  confront  the  eco- 
nomic agents with the wrong price signals. 
In  some  cases,  cross-subsidies  were  introduced  intentionally, 
because it was deemed to be fair that some customers paid inore or 
less than  otlier customers. I11  economics, however, a preference  is 
given to achieve income distribution goals via incoine transfers rather 
than via subsidised prices. 
C.  Where can cross-subsidies occur? 
In the regulated electricity market, the price level and price structure 
at  the  generation  level  were  set  and  controlled by  the  regulator. 
Cross-subsidies could easily be sustained because of the lack of alter- natives to the electricity custoiners. After the liberalisation, this type 
of cross-subsidies is still possible  in the non-liberalised part  of the 
market. 
However, prices for electricity charged to the liberalised part are 
now beyond the control of the regulator and a cross-subsidy from the 
liberalised customers towards tlie captive customers is  not sustain- 
able. Cross-subsidies from the regulated towards the liberalised part 
of the inarket may still exist as tlie incumbent producers or traders 
will try to recover a disproportionate share of their costs via the cap- 
tive customers. 
Because of its typical natura1 monopoly characteristics, it can be 
expected that the traansrnission  activities reinain under the control of 
a regulator, w110  may create (or allow) cross-subsidies between dif- 
ferent types of customers. 
The interaction of cross-subsidies at the genereation and the t~*ans- 
mission  level depends  on the  degree of unbundling  of the  genera- 
tionltrading and transmission activities. The European Directive  on 
the opening of the electricity market requires integrated undertakings 
to keep separate accounts for their generation, transport and distribu- 
tion activities. In Belgium, the law iinposes that transmission activi- 
ties are strictly separated from any other activity. If this separation is 
successful, then cross-subsidies between generation and transmission 
activities will not exist. If the separation is only partially successful, 
aild if the incumbent owner of the transinission firm is able to iiiflu- 
ence the transmission prices, then cross-subsidies between the two 
levels may occur. 
D.  Why do cross-subsidies occur? 
Cross subsidies may arise because of politica1 reasons, because one 
likes to give a preferential treatment to some type of customers or 
because one does not want to charge the full cost of providing a good 
or a service to a given customer type. 
By  definition, joint  costs  cannot  be  allocated  to  one  product 
because these costs were made for the production of more than one 
product. Some sharing rule is needed to allocate these costs to the 
different products.  Other allocation mles will  result  in  other split 
ups of the costs, and using a wrong sharing rule results in an incor- 
rect allocation of the joint costs and thus -  maybe -  in a cross-siib- 
s  i  d  y. I11  most European countries, the ongoing liberalisation process in 
the electricity market has lead to a claim from the sector for stranded 
cost  recovery.  Several  instruments  are  available  and  proposed  to 
finance  this transfer. If  a fee is  imposed  only on the  captive  cus- 
tomers (e.g. a tax on the distribution level), then this might result in 
a cross-subsidy froin the captive customers to the free customers. 
Through predatory pricing, the iilcunibent firm tries to protect its 
marltet share in the liberalised inarket by charging very low prices on 
that market. Charging higher prices in the captive market then must 
compensate the resulting loss in revenue. This can he done, because 
in that part of the market there is no risk of entry. The incurred short 
run  losses  are then  compensated  through price  increases  and  thus 
higher profits when the potential entrants are defeated. Such a strat- 
egy assumes that the defeated entrants wil1 not try to reenter once the 
prices have increased and this is ratlier uiilikely especially if the sunk 
cost involved in entering a market is rather small, whicli is the case 
in the presence of overcapacity in generation equipment. 
When the incumbent firn is supplying both the liberalised and the 
regulated part of the market, and when price regulation is of the cost- 
of-service (COS) typelO,  then the firm has an incentive to allocate as 
much as possible its joint costs of production to the regulated market. 
In that market, the firm can recover its costs through the regulated 
price. In the liberalised market, the firm can increase its profit mar- 
gin (lteeping the price  coiistant while decreasing the average cost), 
since now  only a small  share of the joint  costs is to be  collected 
through that inarket. 
E. Existing volunta~y  cross-subsidies in the current Belgian electric- 
ity rnarliet 
In Belgium, the price per kWh covers the cost of tlie generation, the 
transmission  and  (if  applicable)  the  distribution  stage.  Thus,  not 
much is known ahout how the cost of the transmission service is allo- 
cated to the different types of customers (large industrial customers, 
sinall industrial custoiners (SME's) and residential customers). It can 
very wel1 be the case that these costs are recovered from the cus- 
toiners by charging a fixed amount per kWh, irrespective of the size 
of deinand, the timing of consumptioii, .  .  . 
This would correspond to a so-called postage stamp tariff. Aalbers 
et al. (1999) made some calculations for the Dutch transmission grid and they conclude that the poteiltial for cross-subsidies is quite large 
if a pure postage stamp pricing inethod would be used". 
If in Belgium an implicit postage  stamp is used, then it is likely 
that  the  industrial customers  are  cross  subsidising the  low voltage 
and  (to  a  lesser  extent)  the  medium  voltage  consuiners.  This  is 
because electricity generators supply their output mainly to the high 
voltage grid, and large industrial customers usually take their elec- 
tricity froin the high voltage grid. Therefore, they would only have to 
pay  for  transniission  over  the  high  voltage  grid,  whereas  with  a 
postage stamp they als0 pay a part of the cost for transport over the 
medium aizd the low voltage grid. 
Currently, a few smal1 iiitentional cross-subsidies exist. They have 
to do with the stimulation of the production of "green electricity", the 
stimulation of rational use of energy and the tariffs for coinbined heat 
and power production. Overall tliey represent only a smal1 share of 
total costs. 
In the past, transfer pricing took place between the generation firm 
(Electrabel) and that part of the distribution sector under the control 
of  Electrabel.  This  mechanism  exploited  the  differente  in  the  tax 
treatment of profits at the corporate level and at the distribution level. 
Thus, a cross-subsidy may be (have been) present in the sense that 
mixed intercommunalities are (were) paying too low prices for their 
electricity  compared  to  the  prices  paid  by  the  other  customers. 
According to the regulator  of the  captive inarltet (the CCEG), this 
mechanism is not operational any inore as there is now a fiscal com- 
pensation in place. One is als0 thinking about applying the Same tax 
rate at the distribution level as wel1 as at the corporate level. 
F.  Cross-subsidies in a partially  liberalised Belgian electrici~  ~narket 
Competitive forces will push the market price for electricity genera- 
tion towards  a level that more closely reflects the marginal cost of 
electricity  generation. Therefore,  existing  cross-subsidies  froin the 
liberalised part of the marltet towards the captive part of the market 
cannot be sustained. 
On the other hand, existing cross-subsidies from the regulated part 
of the market to the non-regulated part of the inarket will continue as 
tliis helps the incumbent finn to iinprove its competitive position in 
the  liberalised  part  of  the  inarket  (predatory  pricing)  or  to  inake 
higher profits in that market. If the COS mechanism is maintained in the regulated market, the 
risk exists that the incumbent firm allocates more than a fair share of 
the joint costs of electricity generation to the captive market because 
of its de facto monopoly position in that market. 
G. Major potential  channels for  cross-subsidies aJter the libevalisa- 
tion 
At the generation level, there  is a clear incentive for the regulated 
firm to allocate a more than reasonable share of the joint costs to the 
regulated market. Therefore, a careful and thorough study of the cost 
allocation mechanism in the regulated firm is necessary, whatever the 
pricing mechanism that is chosen in the regulated market (COS, price 
cap or yardstick). This is because in each of the three cases, the ini- 
tial price levels are determined on the basis of such a cost allocation 
exercise. Basically, the three pricing mechanisms only differ in the 
way prices are allowed to evolve in the later periods. 
A second important channel  for unwanted  cross-subsidies is the 
transmission sector. This activity remains under the (in)direct control 
of the incumbent firm.  In the liberalised market, the large industrial 
customers have three options: 
buy electricity from the curreiit electricity producer (Electrabel); 
buy electricity abroad, or; 
invest in an own generation plant (CHP or CCGT). 
Under the first two options, the transmission  grid still needs to be 
used to supply electricity. Under the last option, the use of the trans- 
mission grid is avoided (except for back-up services). The presence 
of this third option indirectly puts a pressure on the pricing strategy 
applied by the transmission company. If the transmission conipany 
sticks to a pure postage stamp tariff (and the iinplied cross-subsidies), 
then tliis wil1 give more incentives to the large industrial customers to 
choose for an own CHP or CCGT installation. 
H. Redzicing the potential jòr  unwanted cross-subsidies: a proposal 
The  current  pure  COS-based  pricing  rule  should  be  abandoned 
beca~~se  of the incentives it provides to the regulated firm to allocate 
joint  costs  maximally  to  the  regulated  market.  Furthennore,  COS 
pricing gives very little incentives to the regulated firm to produce in a cost-efficient way. It is therefore preferable to move to a pricing 
mechanism that makes the firm  the residual claimant of its cost sav- 
ings. This wil1 give more incentives to the incumbent firm to look for 
the most efficient production process,  and to allocate the costs in a 
correct way. This pricing mechanism could be a price cap system or 
a system based on yardstick competition. Two other options to red~ice 
the potential for unwanted cross-subsidies are to speed up the liberal- 
isation process and to organise a better control of the cost allocation. 
A price cap scheme features high incentive power in the sense that 
the regulated firm  is the residual claimant of its cost savings. The reg- 
ulator sets a price ceiling for each good or for a basket of goods that is 
provided by the regulated fm.  This price ceiling is then adjusted over 
the regulatory period on the basis of a price index12. If the price ceil- 
ing is defined for a basket of goods, then the firn1 has some discretion 
in  determining the price  structure within the  basket as long  as the 
(weighted) average price of the basket is not above the price ceiling. 
Giving some discretion to the regulated firm  with respect to the 
price stnicture of the goods in the basket is to be preferred above set- 
ting a price cap for each good in the basket. This gives the firn more 
flexibility in adapting to changes in the cost structure. If necessary, 
some constraints  can  be  put  on  this  discretion  in  order  to  avoid 
abuses at the level of cross-subsidies. When a price  cap system is 
added to a COS system that contains important cross-subsidies, it can 
take a long time to eliminate the cross-subsidies 
With yardstick competition, the evolution of the prices in the reg- 
ulated market is made a function of the observed evolution of prices 
in similar marltets in other countries. Therefore, the yardstick should 
be chosen carefully. This system requires careful preparation, as the 
underlying  characteristics of the different electricity inarltets can be 
very different (The level of the prices at the beginning of the bench- 
mark  period  compared  to  the  prices  in  the  national  markets,  the 
stranded cost policy, the size of the marltet opening.. .). 
A second way to red~ice  the potential for unwanted cross-subsidies 
at the generation level is to speed up the liberalisation process and to 
allow distribution companies to shop f'or  lower priced electricity. 
The third way to reduce the potential for unwanted cross-subsidies 
is to organise a better control of the cost allocation mechanism that is 
used by the regulated firm. A comprehensive cost allocation analysis 
should be conducted on a regular basis. This exercise must be  wel1 
documented and the results must be made public. Our  proposal  for  the  electricity  market  is  to  base  the  delivery 
prices  for regulated  consumers,  during  the  transition period  1999- 
2007, on a weighted average of two elements: 
=  the cost of delivery using the present COS system; 
the prices offered by competitors in neighbouring countries for 
similar delivery conditions; 
The weight  of the  second component  will  increase  so as to reach 
100% in 2007. 
This system has three advantages compared to the continuation of the 
present COS system: 
it provides  a smooth transition to the fully liberalised system; 
by introducing elements of a price cap, it contains a stronger 
incentive for cost minimisation; 
by benchmarking the price cap in function of the prices abroad, 
one guarantees that gains in productivity are also translated int0 
the prices for the protected market segment. 
In order to avoid cross-subsidy via the present COS system, it is nec- 
essary that the cost allocation exercise is systematic and carried out 
in a more open process with independent experts. 
It is also advised to make sure that generation and transmission 
activities are fully unbundled, not only in the legal sense, but also in 
practice. The obligation that generation or trading and transmission 
activities are carried out by legally separated firms is not sufficient. 
In practice, Electrabel will still be a major shareholder in the elec- 
tricity transmission  company. Monitoring this separation of genera- 
tionltrading  and  transport  activities  will  be  a  difficult  task  and 
requires access to detailed cost information of transmission  activi- 
ties. 
VI.  TRANSMISSION PRICING ISSUES 
In the liberalised market, the network operator has an important but 
difficult role. He has to make available sufficient transmission capac- 
ity for al1 trades between  consumers and generators and he has to 
cover his costs. First, we discuss the specific difficulties of ninning a 
transmission network. Then, we review  a possible pricing  solution 
that has been proposed. A.  What makes transmission pricing  of electricity dSfJicult? 
l. Transmission congestion 
If transmission constraints are binding, so that the amount of power 
flowing through a line is at the safety limit, cheap but distant genera- 
tion inay have to be replaced with more expensive local generation, in 
order to reduce power flows. In the constrained area, the optima1 price 
of electricity rises to the marginal cost of the local generation, or to the 
level needed to ration demand to the amount of electricity available13. 
2.  Transmission losses 
Even if these  are no constraints, power  is lost  in the  transmission 
process  and prices  should reflect  the  fact that  marginal  losses  are 
higher in some places than in others due to the distance of the elec- 
tricity transport.  Ceteris  paribus,  the  higher  the voltage  level, the 
lower these losses will be. 
3. Other elements that affect transmission prices 
a. Ancillary services 
The costs associated with the delivery of electric energy include many 
services. The direct fuel cost of generation is only one component. In 
analyses of energy pricing, there is no uniformity in the treatment of 
the other, ancillary services (transport lines with sufficient reliability, 
spinning reserve,  standing reserve,  replacement  reserve14, reactive 
power  (voltage  control)I5,  'black-start'  capabilityI6, active  power 
losses, area control error17). These services have to be supported by 
adequate dispatching and metering systems. 
b.  Market power at the supply side 
When at the generation side, the number of suppliers is limited (as 
will probably be the case in Belgium), then strategic behaviour might 
occur in the sense that the suppliers will try to influence the market 
outcome  through  their  own  behaviour.  This  inight  be  possible, 
because changes in demand or supply in one node of the transmission 
grid have an impact (through transmission losses and capacity con- 
straints) on the transmission  prices  in the whole  grid.  Clearly, the 
possible  existence  of  such behaviour  must  be taken  int0  account 
when a pricing mechanism is designed. Green (1998) coinpares a nodal transmission pricing systeiii witli 
more simple mechanisms. His conclusion is that using simpler pric- 
ing schenies decreases overall economic welfare, but not necessarily 
to a large extent. 
B. Alternative pricing systems for  transmission 
As regards  transmission pricing, one has  the choice between three 
types of pricing niles: postage stamp, distance related tariff and pure 
inarginal cost pricing. 
We exainine the performance of the three systems keeping in mind 
the three criteria to be satisfied by a good transmission pricing sys- 
tem (Green (1997)): 
=  cost coverage; 
=  incentives for efficient operation, investinent and cost miilimisa- 
tion by the transmission company; 
incentives  for  optima1  siting  of  new  generation  plants  and 
important customers; 
l. Postage stamp 
In a postage stamp system one pays for every transaction a fixed tar- 
iff per MW,  this tariff is independent of the distance, place and time 
where the transport flow is needed. The major advantage of this sys- 
tem is that it is easy to administer and allows to cover costs easily by 
using average cost pricing. 
Tlie major disadvantages of this pricing mle is that it does not con- 
tain incentives for more cost-efficient operation and no incentives for 
a good siting of investments in power generation of power consump- 
tion. 
2.  Distance related tariff 
In this system, the tariffs are proportional to the (geographical) dis- 
tance between the generator and the consumer. 
This systein allows cost coverage and contains incentives for min- 
imising  the  transport  distance between  the  generator and the  con- 
sumer. Minimising geographical distance may not be a good criterion 
as transport capacity may be in surplus on some links and may be too 
smal1 on other links. Furthermore, this system does not contain any 
incentives for cost-minimisation by the network operator. 3.  Marginal cost pricing 
In this system the transmissioil price for a given tsade is computed on 
the basis of tlie marginal cost of this transaction. This marginal cost 
can vary according to time and location. It includes the achlal systein 
cost (power losses,  ancillary  services) and the  opportunity  cost of 
transport capacity. The latter nleans that, when there  is a capacity 
shortage, olie customer precludes other customers from making inter- 
esting transactions.  This  is  the  theory, in practice  there  are  many 
impleinentation constraints. 
The  advantage  of  this  systein  is  that  it  contains  different  good 
incentives for correct use of the existing transmission possibilities. It 
is however complex to manage. Furthermore, simple marginal cost 
pricing does not guarantee cost recovery. Some kind of Ramsey pric- 
ing or two part pricing is necessary to conserve the efficiency prop- 
erties of marginal cost pricing and have cost recovery. Finally, mar- 
ginal cost pricing as such does not guarantee cost minimisation from 
the side of the operator. 
C. A proposal for Belgium 
In the firmly linked Belgian grid, in which actual power flows are 
very  difficult to predict due to the large nuinber  of parallel patl.is 
and  the  dynamic  characteristics  (open  switches  os maintenance), 
marginal  cost  pricing  is  almost  impossible. Therefore,  a  pricing 
scheme starting from a postage stamp method, with improvements 
to give incentives for optiinal siting of new generation and demand 
in the future, efficient use of the existing grid and cost minimisation 
is proposed. The postage stamp is applicable to both producers aild 
consumers. 
We  sketch some of the features of this proposal here: 
l. Postage stamp for cost coverage and non-discriinination 
The annual postage stanip tariff sliould allow the transmission com- 
pany to recover its costs for running the system while treating al1 grid 
customers, using  the  grid at the  Same time and place,  in a similar 
way. Starting from the existing situation, these costs should include 
al1 functions the systein operator has to provide: maintenance,  genera1  iinprovement,  increasing  reliability  and 
keeping the system in line with the present state of technology- 
this cost wil1 be referred to in short as 'maintenance cost'18; 
reserve capacity (spiiining reserve, standing reserve and replace- 
ment reserve); 
reactive power and voltage contro1l9; 
black start capability, bought by the transmission company froin 
generation companies; 
losses in the grid; 
metering and billing of energy and power flow; 
personnel and operational cost. 
Next to the achal costs, a fair return on investments should be part of 
the basic postage stainp rate. 
These costs are allocated to customers according to the following 
principles: 
a.  An individual cost coinponent 
Costs that can clearly be identified as being due to a particular cus- 
tomer are charged to this custoiner. These include: 
connection  costs (being different for different voltage  levels); 
metering and billing, and; 
reactive power for outlyers. 
b.  A  demand coinponent 
Fixed costs, i.e. maintenance, genera1 iinprovement, increasing relia- 
bility and keeping the system in line with the present state of tech- 
nology, black-start capability and personnel cost plus the fair return 
on investment, are charged per kVA peak demand. 
In order to avoid cross-subsidies between grid users at different volt- 
age levels, it can be argued that al1 transmission clients (generators, 
consuiners, traders, brokers,. .  .) directly connected to the extra high 
voltage grid (380, 220 and  150 kV) should only be charged for the 
extension and maiiiteiiance of the extra high voltage part of the grid. 
Consuiners or generators connected to the high voltage level (70, 36 
and 30 kV) should be charged for the entire grid (30 to 380 kV). This 
assumes that al1 power passes through the extra high voltage grid, or 
at least that al1 customers benefit from the extra high voltage grid. 
In this  respect,  the present  system with various types of contracts 
(clients  requiring  only  50  Hz  and  meeting  power  fluctuations - clients requiring back-up power if available -  clients requiring total 
system services) could be largely inaintained. 
c. Ai1 energy coiiiponent 
Variable costs, i.e. the costs of losses, reserve and reactive power, are 
charged per kWh. 
In order to avoid cross-subsidies between users at different voltage 
levels, the cost of losses, reserve and reactive power is differentiated 
per  voltage  level, through  a charge based  on  a voltage  dependent 
inultiplication of the actual consunlption. 
This siinple approach could in the  future be replaced with more 
accurate calculations, which should indicate -  in average, but perhaps 
not for each individual node -  the dependence of losses, reserve and 
reactive power on the different voltage levels. 
2.  Incentive for dispatching generation and for the siting of new gen- 
eration or demand 
The system operator should provide incentives for both dispatch of 
generation and for future investments in generation and new demand 
nodes to be located at those places where they best support the over- 
all system regarding congestion, losses (including those under peak 
conditions), voltage stability, reliability and safety. A generator may 
be at a point in the grid where its presence is essential to maintain 
voltage  stability. Therefore,  the  value  of  that  generator  should be 
higher than that of a generator at a very stable node. 
For particular  investments, the parties  involved inay require  the 
grid operator to make a confidential study of the precise  effect for 
their intended investment in the potential nodes. 
The node dependent surplus or discount leads to a better dispatch- 
ing, reducing congestion and losses and improving the network sta- 
bility, and in  this way encourages efficient use of the existing net- 
work. Furthermore, it also provides a long-term incentive for siting 
new generation or demand. 
3.  Incentive for efficient operation and network investment 
a. Maintenance and operation 
The system operator should be rewarded or penalised for the quality 
of his operation, including inaintenance, switching of lines, voltage regulation,  . .  . The criterion is the overall system reliability. The best 
way to judge this is to measure the amount of energy in kWh that has 
not been delivered to the consumers,  or the ainount of  energy not 
taken from the cheapest generators because of system failure or con- 
gestion. The quality could be compared with neighbouring systems. 
b.  Investment and network expansion 
By investing, the network operator can improve the quality and reli- 
ability of the power system, thereby reducing penalties. Furthermore, 
included in the total cost leading to the basic postage stamp rate, is a 
fair return on investment and capita1 cost. 
However, al1 this may lead to over-investment and a gold plated 
network. Therefore, an incentive for overall cost reduction is needed. 
This is a fundamental problem  in any monopoly system. The best 
solution is a system of benchrnarking, through comparison with sim- 
ilar power systems in other countries. Great care has to be taken in 
selecting systems that are comparable with the Belgian grid, and in 
making a fair comparison taking due note of objective differences. 
4.  Transparency 
Clearly al1 tariffs -  or at least the formula to calculate them -  should 
be published in order to allow the clients to use the system in an opti- 
mal and efficient way. This also applies for the node dependent Grid 
Quality Charge. 
VII.  ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
A.  Environmental standards in electricip y~*oduction 
Environmental  standards, mainly  those  focussing on air pollution, 
influence the choice of generation technology and therefore the cost 
of  electricity  generation.  This  chapter  discusses  the  existing  sec- 
ondary EU legislation as wel1 as new developments on environmen- 
tal policy. 
Actually, there exist three main Directives dealing with large com- 
bustion plants. Directive 841360 sets a framework for dealing with air 
poll~itants  from industrial plants  and  introduced principles  such as 
prior authorisation of constniction of industrial processes and use of Best Available  Technologies Not  Entailing  Excessive  Cost  (BAT- 
NEEC). LCPD, the Directive on controlling Emissions from Large 
Combustion Plants sets out emission standards for particulates, S02 
and NOx, and emission ceilings for S02  and NOx. Finally, Directive 
96/61/EC  concerning  Integrated  Pollution  Prevention  and  Control 
(IPPC)  requires  the  introduction  of  an  integrated  environmental 
licensing system, which will apply to a range of industrial processes, 
including power stations larger than 50 MW. 
The  following  developments  will  affect  pollution  control  for 
power plants in the EC: 
Air Quality  Stringent national  caps for S02 and NOx and particulates 
and lead 
Acidification  Reducing S02 emissions across the EC by placing restric- 
tions on the sulphur content of certaiil liquid fuel products 
Revision ofLCPD  Overall  update,  promotion  of  CHP  (Combined  Heat  and 
Power) 
Water  A special Directive on water would set standards and inech- 
anisms  for  ensuring  that  limit  values  under  the  IPPC 
Directive are observed. 
Waste  Wil1 be  covered  by  the  IPPC  Directive  and by  the  EC's 
existing legislation on waste. 
Kyoto Protocol  Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EC is committed to reducing 
greenhouse gases emissions by 8% by 2008-2012. In rela- 
tion to 1990 levels. 
The Commission is examining the measures that need to be taken 
at Community level to ensure equivalent competitive conditions as a 
result  of environmental requirements  to meet the above-formulated 
requirements. 
B. Standards for  nuclear decommissioning 
Unlilte other types of generation, nuclear power plants must include 
in  their  cost  a factor  for the  storage  of nuclear  waste  and  future 
decommissioning  of the plant.  Diverging  regulatory  approaches to 
the management of decommissioning funds may cause market distor- 
tions. 
At the inoinent, there is no specific EC legislation on the decom- 
missioning of power plants, but, within the single market, a common 
approach will be needed, also leading to a better protection of popu- 
lation and environment, to a reduction of waste,. . . 
According to  the  Commission, decommissioning costs must be 
seen  as part  of the  electricity production  and  may  not  be  cross- subsidised from the transmission activity nor directly subsidised via 
state aid. To identify the decommissioning cost, a detailed prelimi- 
nary study must be executed taking int0 account al1 the relevant fac- 
tors such as safety, environmental and financial issues,. .  . The fund 
must  be  secured  and  controlled  by  the  mandated  authorities  and 
only dedicated to decommissioning. The full fund must be available 
at the foreseen time. 
C. Healthy competition for  environmental regulation when there is 
no transboundary pollution 
Let us discuss first the case of pollution that is strictly national: some 
types of generation plants only affect the neighbourhood. In this case 
differences in national regulations  should correspond to differences 
in national environmental preferences (say lower population density) 
or differences in public efficiency. An example of less efficient pub- 
lic regulation could be that marketable permits are not accepted. 
The result of these differences in regulation and preferences could 
be changes in the location of power production in Western Europe. A 
transfer of polluting power production to less densely populated areas 
could happen and this is for economists a demonstration of beneficia1 
international trade. 
D. Unhealthy competition  as  a  result  of  ineficient  regulation  of 
transboundary pollution 
Now take the case of pollutants that affect the national population but 
als0 affects the bordering countries. If the cross-border effects are not 
internalised  by  every  country,  unhealthy  competition  can  exist. 
Internalisation requires compensation of neighbouring countries for 
any damages done to thein or at least their consent for any new plant 
or production. Whenever transboundary pollution is allowed witliout 
internalisation, those countries upriver or upwind will overspecialise 
in dirty power prod~iction.  This is an example of inefficient competi- 
tioii. 
The EU commission will face some tough questions here. A first 
question  is  nuclear  energy.  Soine  couiltries want  to  close  nuclear 
power  stations  before  the  end  of  their  economic  life  (Sweden, 
Germany).  Other  countries  (France?)  might  want  to  expand  their 
nuclear  power  production.  Heavy  nuclear  accidents  imply  clearly cross boundary damages. Pollution from normal operation is proba- 
bly  confined  to  the  region.  Wil1  we  accept  that  some  countries 
expand nuclear power while others are trying to close it? 
A second case of interest is the C02  emission reduction ceiling that 
has been imposed on the EU by the Kyoto agreement. This global cap 
has been translated into national caps that  are not necessarily  effi- 
ciently distributed  in  the  sense that the marginal cost  of  emission 
reduction is equalised over countries. The result will be a bias against 
electricity production in those countries that have received an ineffi- 
cient cap. This could be overcome by allowing the EU countries (or 
the electricity producers) to trade C02 emission rights. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Although there is a clear momentum and direction towards liberali- 
sation, many issues are still unsolved. The first 10 years of the British 
experience learn US that liberalisation does not produce its hl1 eco- 
nomic benefits when the number of competing producers remains too 
small. We  identified four major problems in the liberalisation of the 
European electricity sector. The stranded cost issue can most easily 
be resolved by not accepting any compensation for stranded costs. 
Cross-subsidy problems between the liberalised and the non-liber- 
alised section of the market will probably only disappear when the 
whole market is liberalised. The toughest intellectual problem is the 
design  of  a  good  transmission pricing  scheine. This  is  now  left 
largely to the member states so that country experiences might teach 
US  interesting lessons over the coming decade. Differences in envi- 
ronmental regulation have been identified as the fourth inajor prob- 
lem in the European liberalisation. The solution here has to include a 
correct internalisation of cross-boundary pollution. 
Liberalising the European electricity sector is not an easy task and 
will keep US busy in the next ten years. 
NOTES 
1.  Certain consumers are defined as "eligible".  These consumers only can move on the 
open inarlet. 
2.  Between generators and eligible consnmers. 3.  This coefficient was  constructed by  dividing coluriin 2 by  column 3 of Table 2 in 
Wolfrain (1999). 
4.  The nuclear generator wanted its units r~~nning  contiiiuously (base load) arid did ~iot 
havc a large capacity therefore there were only two real competitors. 
5.  The Thatcher govemment decided io build 10 Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR). In 
tlie begiiiiiing of the privatisatioii there was an obligation for the RECs to buy nuclear 
power and a fuel levy to pay for decommissioni~ig  liabilities. 
6.  More partic~ilarly,  we fociis on a inarket with one hoinogenous coimnodity. This can 
he electricity delivered at a constant flow over thc ycar with a given level of quality. 
Using a multiproduct approach for electricity (peak, off peak, etc.) is iiiore realistic 
but wil1 obscure the stranded costs analysis in tliis section without adding value to the 
argument. 
7.  The linearity of MC,  (and thus  also AVC,)  is assuined  for tlie sake of siinplicity. 
Unless it is mentioned explicitly, this does not influence the maiii coiiclusioii of tlie 
aiialysis. 
S.  It is  assuined  that  one entrant  enters the  doniestic  rnarket. The results  would  not 
change if more than olie competitor would enter. The assuinption of perfectly inelas- 
tic demand for electricity is acceptable in tlie short i-un and helps the exposition. 
9.  Note that other definitions of strandable costs would result in an other position of tlie 
AF,&,  -curve. 
10. Until  1999, Belgium had a pricing  systein that closely resernbled COS regulation. 
With COS regulation, prices are set such that a revenue requirernent is realised. There 
are two major  probleins  with  this type  of pricing.  First,  tlie  mechaiiisin has little 
incentive power. Tlie incentive power of a pricing sclieme is measured by tlie pres- 
sure it puts on the regulated finn to provide its goods or services at the lowest possi- 
ble cost. Second, tariffs are not necessarily close to the marginal costs and thus they 
do not necessarily provide incentives to consumers for a correct use electricity. 
11. On the basis of the figures iii their report, a pure postage stamp price of 0.700 BEF 
per kWh was calculated.  If the price would he differeiitiated according to the cus- 
tomer type (high voltage, medium voltage and low voltage custoiners), then Aalbers 
et al. (1999) fiiid transmission prices ranging from 0,256, over 0,531 to 1,025 BEF 
per kWh, respectively. With a further differentiation according to the voltage level at 
the generation side, the price differences would become even larger. 
12. A well-knowii example is the RPI-X formula that is used in the British electricity sec- 
tor. 
13. Congestion lias to he avoided for economic but also for reliability reasons. The total 
cost of capacity, losses and reactive power requireinents of a line are niiniinised wlien 
the line is loaded at around 50% of its capacity. For reliability reasons, tlie loss of a 
liile may not lead to a systein collapse. With two identical lines in parallel on a route, 
this is achieved automatically by not loading the lines above 50%. When alternative 
routes exist, higher loading is of coursc possible. However, higher loading leads to an 
increased risk of voltage instability. Even though there is no sharp limit, a maximum 
safe rating is calculated for every line, depending on teinperature aiid power factor of 
transinission over the line. It should be noted that power flows in the opposite direc- 
tion of the dominant power flow diminish the total power flow, and relieve conges- 
tion. 
14. A characteristic of electricity is that it can not be stored. At each second, generation 
has to match demand, which fluctuales unpredictably. This is the so-called genera- 
tion-demand  balancing. To  achieve this, power plants  do not operate at maxiinurn 
power, hut keep a certain ainount of reserve. Tlie power output from al1 plants is con- 
stantly adapted, autoinatically, in a matter of seconds. Reserve power is also used for 
compensating large unbalances, due to e.g. errors in predicting demand and generator 
failures.  If the  amount  of  instantaneously  available  reserve  power  (the  spinning reserve)  is used,  other power plants  that were at stand-by are started tip  (standing 
reserve). These power plants are replaced in their turn by power plants designated as 
replaceinent reserve. 
15. Power in an AC systein consists of active and reactive power. Active or real power is 
tlie power coinpoilent that can be transformed in any other form of energy, such as 
mechanica1 energy. It can be transported over large distances, although there always 
is sorne loss. Reactive power is needed to maintain the overall voltage level in the 
grid,  enabling the transport  of real power. Reactive power  itself can not be trans- 
ported  over large distances or iinported  froin other countries, i.e. it has to be pro- 
diiced locally. The blackout in a large part of The Netherlands in the summer of 1997 
is an interesting example of oile of the risks due to a large import of electricity (i.e. 
active power only) combined with a very significant independent generation (deceil- 
tralised production) and an inappropriate pnce structure. The independent generators 
are only paid for their active power output. The ensuing lack of reactive power in the 
grid was the main cause of the blackout.  It is clear fitture price structures have to 
incorporate a coinpensation for the reactive power. 
16. The ability to restart the power system after an overall black-out,  without  support 
from other countries. 
17. Each country, or to be more precise each control area, performs generation-deinand 
balancing, taking account of the scheduled import or export. This intended level of 
import or export is called the area control error. 
18. This cost, part of the demand component, is considered separately for the different 
voltage levels, i.e. extra high and high voltage. 
19. The cost of reserve and reactive power, making up the energy component, is consid- 
ered separately for the different voltage levels, i.e. extra high and high voltage. 
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